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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines globalization and development in Africa, it posits that the impact of globalization differs in 
degree and scope from one country to another, while it encourages the development of some countries, it makes 
others especially developing countries in which African countries are examples, sad losers. This paper argues 
that globalization has not led to development, the argument indicates that globalization contains elements, which 
when taken advantage, could lead to development. 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization, the flow of capital across national boarders to take advantage of more profitable opportunities, is 
not a new phenomenon in the world economy. At the outset of the modern economy, such flows of capital also 
became known as the internationalization of capital. Most essential to globalization is knowledge and the 
discovery of better methods of achieving results. In this direction, communications and the diffusion of 
knowledge were not rapid in relative terms because a slower process of transformation characterized the old 
phase of globalization. 
 This paper examines the relationship between globalization and development which affects the 
sustained improvements in people’s living standards. The arguments   in this paper is that globalization has not 
led to development. However, the argument indicates that globalization contains elements, which when taken 
advantage of, could lead to development. Development, the argument persists, would take place to the extent that 
social forces working for democracy cum development become increasingly powerful and gain dominance in 
decision-making. Such dominance, in essence, would, mean the existence of a sustainable democracy and 
development. 
The initial part of the paper is a presentation of salient features of the process of globalization. A development-
oriented conceptual framework is embodied in the analysis. The paper presents relevant internal and external 
explanatory factors as well as actions taken at the levels of the state, multinational corporations (MNCs) and the 
people, respectively. Particular attention in the explanation is paid to the various internationally recognized 
development strategies and plans adopted for implementation in the African economy. 
  At the level of strategies, consideration is given to: a) agriculture – based industrialization; b) import – 
substitution industrialization; c) the green revolution; d) export-led industrialization; and e) privatization. Plans 
and programmes to be analyzed include: a) the Lagos plan of Action (LPA); b) the African priority program for 
Economic Recovery (APPER); c) the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development (UN-PAAERD); d) the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in 1990s (UN-
NADAF); e) the United Nations Special Initiative  on Africa (UN-SIA); f) structural Adjustment 
programmes(SAPs); and g) the African Alternative Framework  to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-
SAP). 
 The framework is most critical in facilitating the correct understanding of how economic decisions are 
made and implemented in the real world, and at the local and international levels, At the end of the day, we are 
better off in our search solutions to Africa’s burning problems if we know how the real world actually operates. 
In making observations on the relationship between globalization and development, one finds that the perennial 
problems of the qualification and relevance of statistical data persist. There is a duality in the qualification 
problem. One aspect has to do with the fact that the world economy exhibits a movement from manufacturing to 
services. Generally, the production and distribution of manufactured products can be measured reliably. The 
other aspect is that the “invisible” nature of digital-based information technology renders it enormously difficult 
to measure the variables accurately, leaving much of its effects unmeasurable  to date in conventional terms.  
 The long-standing conventional measure for development is the change in per capita income over time. 
In developing countries, especially the African ones, there is the perennial paucity of the statistical database. 
Even in cases where data on per capita income are considered to be accurate, at best, as an average, it says 
something about the condition of a typical person in an economy. In the general situation that obtains in Africa 
economies, where at least three-quarters of the people under subsistence conditions, a positive per capital or real 
per capital income figure is misleading. This is because it gives the impression that the typical person has some  
income, which in almost all cases are not true. Once this defect is realized, one can then say that the low per 
capita income figures indicate the considerable skewness  in income distribution. This distribution shows how a 
handful of people account for the bulk of the income indicated in the per capita income, while the vast majority 
of the people experience subsistence living. Living no real monetary income at  all.  
 The latest and most influential conventional device for measuring living conditions is the human 
development index (HDI) published annually since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme 
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(UNDP). The HDI is based on a composite of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, regular schooling and per 
capita income. The HDI is an attempt to go beyond the conventional economic reliance on per capita income 
criteria to measure changes in living conditions over time. 
 Even using the HDI, per capita income continues to play a prominent role. Additionally, the theoretical 
and policy imperatives for the HDI proceed on the basis that there exists a positive relationship between adult 
and schooling (referred to as education), on the one hand, and intelligence, on the other hand. According to these 
imperatives, as adult literacy and schooling situations improve, this necessarily means that the literate and the 
schooling people use their knowledge to enjoy better living conditions. This view does not hold, primarily 
because of the general poor orientation found in literacy training and schooling in the poor countries. Because 
people in these countries do not acquire a useful understanding of their own realities through this form of 
learning, they are not able to transform the condition of their existence. For the reason, the HDI becomes 
problematic as it also deals with quantitative changes in people’s  lives rather than qualitative ones.  
 In the midst of the considerable statistical data problems, one has to keep searching for appropriate 
development measurement devices; one useful place to look is in the area of internal conflicts and the refugee 
problem. Clearly, significant improvements in living conditions would reduce considerably the internal conflicts, 
especially the violent ones, and the refugee problem. In effect, one cannot observe in an economy the existence 
of development, on the one hand, and internal conflicts plus the refugee problem, on the other. Conventional data 
are used in the paper. Additionally, in the analysis on the African experience, internal conflicts and the refugee 
problem are presented to strengthen the comprehension of the relationship between globalization and 
development.  
Globalization: The Salient Features 
Globalization is well documented from the colonial era up to present times. Initially, there was mercantile trade, 
which characterized the essence of capital movements. The capital moved across national boarders to engage 
mainly in the purchase of exotic materials for consumption from the developing countries for export to the 
developed countries. Then we moved to the period of colonization in which the main characteristics was the 
production of raw materials for export to the metropolitan counties of Europe for their industrial production. This 
trend in production and trade has continued and in teams of world production and trade.  
 Globalization has intensified this trend in all directions. The process has produced a differentiation in 
the production process from material production to the services sector. Important among which is the financial 
sector. For instance, between 1965 and 1990, trade merchandise more than tripled. During the same period, 
global trade in services increased by more than 1,300 percent. Financial flows have become the dominant 
element in the current trends. For instance, within a 24 hour period, more than one trillion dollars moves around 
the globe in search of higher returns, indicating the highly dramatic levels that finance capital flows now reached 
in world economic relationships (UNDP, 1996). In a single year. 1994/95, foreign direct investment rose to some 
$318 billion, a 40 percent increase over the previous period (UNCTAD, 1996). A trend which was sighted as 
early as the 19th century persists. That is the domination of foreign direct investment by fewer and fewer firms in 
a relatively few countries. In terms of assets, size,  the biggest one hundred MNCs are based in developed 
countries. Thirty of these MNCs are based in the United States of America alone. Japan’s share in these MNCs is 
twenty.  
 The highly dramatic leap in trade in services is accounted for mainly by the impact of digital-based 
information technology on globalization. The enormous cost-reducing impact of this new information 
technology has enabled MNCs to globalize further production and financial markets by tasking advantage of the 
lower cost opportunities. Computer now cost  more than a 100% of what they cost 25 years ago. These 
opportunities have assisted the MNCs to communicate much faster and better. Since 1976 the capacity of digital-
based information technology (IT) had increased over one million times. Nearly 40 years ago, there were some 
50,000 computers in the world. Now, the number of computers world-wide  as at  January  2013 has increased 
astronomically to more than 250 million. In 1960, a transatglantic telephone cable had a capacity of 138 
simultaneous calls. Now a fiber-optic cable has a capacity of 1.5 million simultaneous conversations. There is a 
doubling of internet users yearly, with the invention of ipads, blackberrys, androids, i-phones etc.wth its present 
user level standing at more than 300 million worldwide.  
 These phenomenal IT developments have played no small role in enhancing globalization. During that 
past decade, world trade has been growing twice as fast as world output. For the same period, foreign direct 
investment has been increasing three times as fast as world output. Daily trading in foreign exchange has 
exceeded $1.5 trillion. Since 1970, for the United States economy, international transactions in bonds and 
equities have catapulted from 3 percent of GDP to approximately 150 percent.  
A Development- Oriented Framework  
Most crucial to the delineation of a development oriented framework is the view that structural features in the 
world economy emerged and maintained, developed and changed through the inter-action of various sets 
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economic decision-makers (Tipoteh, 1989). The decision-makers who perceived that they benefit from the 
persistence of a given structure will work individually and collectively to develop the structure. They will make 
reform from time to time, in line with change unless their decision-making were to become cost-prohibitive. 
Those who have interest in it and power to sustain it promote this dominant structure. The 19 October 1987 stock 
market crash is the clearest catalytic signal to date, providing information with respect to the demise of the 
follow-the-leader oligopolistic decision-making in the world capitalist economy. The principal long-term capital 
markets, which were located in Britain before the war and relocated to the US during the post-war period, are 
now located in Japan and china. The US economy is no longer the bank of last resort for OECD  countries. In 
fact, the US is now one of the world’s largest debtor, with Japan,china and Germany as the lenders to the US 
economy.  
 In terms of the developing countries, the colonial capitalist production system has been reformed and 
this persists in the post-colonial era with no significant effects. The colonial strategy of capitalist production 
remains in the hands of dominant social forces that determined the process. The production of primary 
commodities for export to the metropolitan countries continues. Through the active collaboration between 
national economic decision-makers in the developing countries and the owners of the MNCs, which dominated 
and control these economies, the primacy of the export-orientation is sustained.  
 As  MNCs began penetrating developing economies at a relatively very powerful phase in their 
evolution, local capitalist initiatives in developing countries relevant to industrialization continued to be over-
powered by foreign capitalist industrialized economies. This element of foreign domination and control of local 
capital was not the case in the capitalist industrialized economies in their transition from agrarian societies to 
industrialized ones.  
 Given the relatively low ceiling on the capitalist production vis-à-vis industrialization, the continuous 
operationalisation  of the export-orientation necessarily means the linking of production inputs to imports in a 
direct relationship. Furthermore, with the foreign tastes and preference of national decision-makers being assets 
became widespread among the decision-makers. The repression of institutional change consist with rendering the 
national decision-makers accountable to the people in general provides no incentive for the decision-makers to 
change fraud mentally. In the midst of persistent resistance to the repression, national decision-makers \have 
tended to increase assert-holdings abroad, as seen in the capital flight situation. In relatively few, but growing 
number of cases in the developing world, there have been attempts to build a development-oriented economy 
such as those in South-East Asia.  
 Nevertheless, owing to the deep recessions, especially those experienced in the period 1979-82, strong 
decision-makers in the West tended to resort to the use of soft and hard measures to get the weak decision-
makers to bear a large share of this cost of recovery. The soft measures cover the increased use of transfer 
pricing to reduce “free” market commodities price determination, rendering stiffer the conditionalities of the 
international financial institutions, higher cost debt rescheduling in the guise of debt relief and adjustment in 
interest rates. In terms of hard measures, the resort to militarism remains clearly dominant. Thus, it is not at all 
surprising to observe that total world annual military expenditures are approximately the same as the total debt of 
the developing countries, which accounts for one-fifth of the expenditure.  
 It is essentially through the foregoing analytical framework that one can correctly understand the nature 
of the debt problem and the sufficient conditions for its alleviation. To attribute the emergence of the debt 
problem to the “all powerful” exogenous explanatory variable (in the international economic environment) is to 
deny the critical explanatory role played by national decision-makers in the developing countries. It is 
endogenous decision-makers that leads to capital flight, without which large amounts of capital which should be 
invested in the developing countries find their way in Swiss or US transnational banks. Finally, it is action taken 
also at the local level that has resulted in the emergence of whatever development-orientation in the few 
developing countries that we continue to observe.  
 Within the developed context, both exogenous and endogenous variables have explanatory roles. The 
essential collaborative relationship between these two  types of variable, with respect to the dynamics of the 
evolution of dominant economic decision-makers, are fundamental for the validity of the model. It is these 
dominant decision-makers who take action to sustain the dominant interest in the global economy and their 
decision-makers account for the evolution of Marginalized economic decision-makers who struggle for the 
emergence of development-oriented structure. These collaborative relationships involve decision-makers in 
developing economic system. Within these collaborative relationships, there are tactical disagreements among 
the dominant decision-makers. Through the dynamic analysis of these relationships, it is possible to understand 
correctly the conditions under which structures are reformed, on the one hand, and changed fundamentally, on 
the other.  
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THE CRISIS IN THE AFRICAN ECONOMIES  
Crisis remains a mainstay of the post-colonial experience in African economies. The engine of growth is mass-
poverty generating, regardless of whether these economies exhibit high growth or low rates (Tipoteh, 1989b). for 
most African economies, the picture is one of low growth, while more than a quarter  of them have a negative 
growth experience for the1970s and 1980s. two –thirds of the world’s least developed countries are African, in 
which per capita income decreased by more than 15 percent in the 1980s. According to the OAU, over half of 
the people live in absolute poverty (Organization of African Unity, 1995).  
 African ranks among those countries with the highest death rates and the lowest life-expectancy rates. 
Approximately one-fifth of African children die before the age of one. Only a quarter of the African population 
has access to safe drinking water. Perhaps there is no other single aspect of the crisis that has an immediate 
dramatic impact on people as the food situation (ECA, 1990a). during the latter part of the 60 percent of the 
African people remained threat tended by starvation. For the 1960s, African experienced a 98 percent food self-
sufficiency ratio, with dropped to 86 percent in 1980. The food problem has deteriorated further in the1980s. 
between 1981 and 1989, food production in Africa “grew” at an average annual rate of a negative 0.52 percent. 
For the same period, food imports per year averaged US$11.8 billion while the average for agricultural export 
earnings was approximately US$12 billion.  
 This situation had deteriorated further in the 1960s. imports and food aid are meeting more than 25 
percent of Africa’s food requirement. These declines in food production with the rise in food imports, given 
increasing demand for food, have combined to raise food prices. The co-existence of mass poverty with raising 
food prices necessarily means inadequate access to food, considering that most African working people are 
subsistence farmers.  
 With the general persistence decline in economic activity during the 1990s, African economies did not 
generate production that would curb the already high unemployment situation. Thus, unemployment grew 
approximately 10 percent annually in over half of the African countries. In this situation, women and youth have 
considerably more difficulties than men in finding employment. With generally deteriorated economic situations, 
public expenditures that are crucial people’s welfare have been severely slashed in budget-balancing exercises at 
the command of the World Bank and the IMF.  
 Commodity prices have collapsed, as they had never done before in the 1980s (ECA, 1990c). At the 
start of the second half of the 1980s, export earnings fell by at least one-third on account of the unprecedentedly 
disastrous decline in commodity prices have declined by over half of their 198 levels. This situation had a clear 
impact on Africa’s terms of trade, which decreased by 40 percent during the 1980s. To make matters worse, 
Africa’s declining capacity to earn foreign exchange has worsened the debt situation. Starting  with an external 
debt position of US$48.3 billion in 1978. African external has gone up almost 500 percent to US$285 billion by 
the end of 1993. External debt has now come to represent over 90 percent of Africa’s GDP. The resulting 
resource gap is widening as Africa is sending more capital abroad than the external financial flows that come 
into the African economies. 
 Despite the proliferation of African government’s socio-economic development strategies and plans 
during the post-colonial era, mass poverty or development problems persist. What went wrong? An evaluation of 
the principal strategies and plans will provide some relevant answers. Almost all agricultural production of 
monocultures, whether based on green revolution or not, have been based on export, mainly to the former 
metropolitan centers. Import-substitution industrialization was mainly for a small elite consumption home 
market, which was not large enough to sustain economies of scale. More significantly, all industrialization 
strategies depended on imports of both raw materials and intermediate technologies. 
Agricultural Development Strategies 
An examination of agricultural development strategies and policies of post-colonial African governments shows 
that they have all been concerned with the continuous integration of producers into international markets. This 
integration is based on the view that the isolation of producers from these markets is the principal cause of mass 
poverty. This is not a view, as it has its roots in colonial policy in Africa. 
 Although a variety of schemes have been utilized to facilitate the integration of African famers into 
national and international markets, nearly all the famers have remained subsistence famers. The principal devices 
used to direct the small farmers towards national and international markets continue to be; (a) extra-economic 
coercion; (b) high taxation; (c) the use of input packages such as high-yielding seed varieties within the green 
revolution context, fertilizers; and (d) high interest on credits. These devices have tended to undermine the small 
farmer’s capacity to release himself from the grip of agribusiness, which has continued to dominate African 
agricultural production. 
 Agricultural production remains basically unimodal, seen in the overwhelming presence of small 
farmers as individuals and members of marketing co-operatives. At the same time, African governments are 
giving attention to the development of large-scale irrigation and settlement schemes as well as integrated rural 
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development projects. Which have the same effect? The state, too, has until recently, used produce marketing 
boards to control peasant production and use it for extortionist taxation and rent-extortion. 
 The way in which MNCs operate in agriculture continues to exacerbate mass poverty. In terms of the 
green revolution, the high yielding varieties, which are cost-prohibitive for small farmers, are produced and 
marketed by MNCs. Furthermore, the best lands are used for green revolution activities and those lands owned 
by MNCs are engaged in agribusiness, thereby rendering large numbers of small famers increasingly landless. 
Furthermore, with their strong connections in the state, MNCs manage to hold the productive development of 
labour at bay by hampering their organizational/collective-bargaining efforts. Most workers in agriculture-based 
MNCs are either unorganized or scantily organized, resulting in low wages being paid to them. 
Import-substitution Industrialization. 
Import-substance industrialization strategies became widely adopted by African governments shortly after their 
entry into the post-colonial era. The implementation of this strategy exhibited the same basic errors made by 
Latin American states in their respective import-substitution industrialization efforts. Most unfortunately, 
African states did not learn anything from these mistakes. What were the mistakes? 
 The inputs for import-substitution industrialization in Africa have been dominated by foreign-produced 
inputs. As we have noted above, most raw materials and intermediate technology needs have been imported from 
the MNCs whose products were “Import-substituted” by the nationalized “National Industries”. The assumed 
comparative advantage of engaging in  manufacturing in such industries as textile production neither yielded the 
expected increase in employment nor the saving of foreign exchange. The assembling of vehicles is considered 
by African states to be a highly important form of industrialization in Africa, when, in fact, there is very little 
value added input. 
 In effect, import-substitution industrialization has enhanced importation of foreign raw materials and 
other inputs rather than reduced it. Raw materials which can be used for the local production of inputs for 
industrialization in Africa are, in general exported to the industrialized countries as was done in colonial times, 
while those required for import-substitution industrialization have been imported in increasing amounts. 
 Furthermore, in a number of countries, export-led industrialization has also strengthened the colonial 
division of labour, where Africa consumes what it does not produce and remains promotive of the production of 
Africa’s abundant raw materials for exportation to industrialized countries for industrial materials produced 
through the use of low-wage labour. Export processing zones (EPZ) have been set up in several African 
countries to promote export-led industrialization, which, like import-substitution industrialization, is dominated 
by the importation of foreign imports. With the trend towards declining commodity prices and the rising trend in 
import prices, the import-dominated industrialization strategy has run into perennially crippling problems, 
largely on account of the exacerbation of already difficult balance-of-payments problem. Furthermore, the 
economic crisis in industrialized countries has resulted in the drastic reduction in financial resource flows. Even 
the major multilateral and regional financing institutions have begun to receive more funds from Africa, as a 
result of enormous debt repayments, than they give to African countries, as we noted above. 
 The current economic crisis in leading Asian economies is particularly instructive for African 
economies. The export-led industrialization model, which dominates in these Asian economies, is often pointed 
out to African countries as the model to emulate. The economies of the “Four Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea) or Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), as they are also called then, are mentioned 
as shining examples of the model’s success. For years  now, these Asian economies, which have been exhibiting 
very high growth rates, have been struggling to get out of deep recession, and without success, not until recently. 
 The very essence of the model explains the quagmire. The use of relatively low-skilled labour to 
manufacture goods for export to high-skilled labour economies, and the rapid diffusion of advanced technologies 
in their economies were bound to pose severe problems for them. Additionally, given the dominance of non-
democratic social forces in the NICs, the attendant lack of accountability for public decision – making meant the 
prevalence of considerable corruption in high places, as manifested in the proliferation of non-productive 
projects which exhibited high growth rates. As such, this was not sustainable over the long term and its day of 
reckoning had to come. 
 The foregoing has shown that widely used development strategies are not promotive of long-term and 
sustainable development. Although African governments rarely criticize their actions, they at one time tried to 
resist World Bank Strategies through the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. They laid out a 
strategy aimed at long-term self-reliant development in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). In this regard, the LPA 
was an attempt to get out of the dependency syndrome. The Plan had noted that indeed rather than result in an 
improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have made the continent stagnate 
and become more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crisis suffered by the industrialized 
countries” (OAU, 1979). To correct this malaise, the African governments made two principal contentions that 
continue to stand correct on the basis of available evidence. These were, firstly, that Africa must desist from total 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.14, 2013 
 
178 
reliance on the production of raw materials for export, and secondly, that the promotion of self-reliance is of the 
highest importance for growth and development in Africa. 
 But this approach flouted the pressures in the world economy towards globalization. Moreover, the 
African states did not have any independent source of financing the Programme. They still hoped that they 
would be “associated” by the international community” to achieve their self-reliance. This in itself revealed a 
deep-seated sense of dependency mentality on the part of African leaders. That is why very soon their efforts 
were pushed aside by the World Bank structural strategies which the Bank, with the IMF, were working out to 
restructure the African economies into the global economy to which these economies belonged in the first place. 
 The dependency   mentally of the African leaders was revealed when in 1985 at the height of the crisis, 
they went on their knees and approached the UN  for a special emergency” session of the General Assembly to 
find solutions to the African crisis. Thus emerged  the United Nations African Priority Programme for Economic 
Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). Its failure could almost be predicted. When it did fail, other 
“Special emergency Programmes” were worked out such as the United Nations Special Initiative on Africa (UN-
SIA) and the African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP). Thus African 
governments remained tied to furthering the promotion of the failed generalized development strategies which 
were being worked out by their bureaucracies in tandem with those of the multilateral institutions to continue the 
strategy of production of raw materials for export in order to pay growing debts. This is the real significance of 
the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 
Structural Adjustment Programmes are the latest phase of the strategies of the two multilateral institutions, the 
World Bank and IMF, with respect to promoting the interests of the world economy dominated by MNCs. 
Foremost, in terms of the objective, the World Bank and IMF seek to promote private foreign investment and 
profit-making opportunities for the MNCs. This is not surprising because both institutions are controlled by the 
G-7, who are accountable to their multinational corporations which continue to dominate investment and trade in 
African economies and the world over. From time to time, Africa governments disagree with the G-7 positions. 
However, as African governments have no fundamental problem with the principal objective of the World Bank 
and IMF, they continue to be supportive of these international institutions. It is the foregoing context that one has 
to observe the policy variations of the World Bank and IMF. 
     During the 1960s and 1970s, the World Bank and IMF interventions in Africa were of relatively short 
duration for any given agreement with a government. However, with the dramatic increase in the price of oil in 
1973 and the deep recession of 1979-82 in the Western industrialized economies, policy variations appeared. The 
World Bank, like the IMF, adopted a medium and longer-term horizon in their lending and financing activities. 
By the early 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank had become virtually indistinguishable in this regard. Although 
the former is identified mainly with balance of payments support and the latter with broader economic problems 
and lending, in this period they seemed to complement each other in their policies, which were referred to as 
economic stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. It is against the foregoing background that 
structural adjustment policies have emerged and been given primacy. 
 The 1973 oil price rise raised expectations in many quarters with respect to possibilities for increasing 
the bargaining power of Oil Exporting Countries in International negotiations. It was hoped that this would act as 
an example to enable other Third World countries to build institutions of bargaining with the bigger power. 
However, it is now generally agreed that the oil surpluses, in their recycling, benefited Western industrialized 
economies far more than poor countries and in the process  imposed even greater economic burden on the other 
Third World countries in terms of high oil prices, which contributed to their debt bondage. 
 Faced with deep recession in their own countries and the immense difficulties faced by Western 
industrialized economies, African countries and other poor countries, became the targets for the transferring of 
much of the Western costs of the recession through adjustment processes, as we have noted above. Since 1968, 
when IMF conditionality became explicit, African governments acquired a clear awareness of the controlling 
essence of the IMF Programmes. Although the World Bank did not have a conditionality policy of its own, this 
soon gave way to the co-ordination of their strategies with the IMF, in which IMF conditionality became an 
aspect of the Bank’s lending strategies under SAPs. By the end of the 1979-81 recessions, the implicit 
conditionality of the Bank had become explicit, virtually removing the veil of difference between the World 
Bank and the IMF. 
 The World Bank and IMF have selected the policy instruments of structural adjustment and economic 
stabilization on the basis of the monetarist policies which place emphasis on the adjustment of imbalance 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply by controlling money supply to curtail demand. This is 
believed to increase efficiency in resource allocation in an effort to boost production and thus bring about the 
long term efficiency of the economy. Based on the foregoing characteristics, the instruments/measures utilized 
are: credit control, fiscal austerity, currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and interest rates, 
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reduction/elimination of subsidies, and the reduction/elimination of trade barriers, as well as efficiency in public 
sector management. Privatization strategy, which merely means opening up the channels of globalization with 
which structural  adjustment is concerned. 
 During the 1980s, most African governments, in their respective capacities as members of the World 
Bank and IMF, launched formal stabilization and structural adjustment program in line with the 
recommendations of those two institutions. For the most part, those African governments that do not have such 
official programmes are in effect implementing policies that are consistent with the pursuance of the principal 
objective of structural adjustment, since they cannot be funded by these institutions unless they adopt some form 
of reform of their economies. 
 In terms of macroeconomic performance, the implementation of structural adjustment policies in Africa 
has not been successful in the realization of their growth objectives. In a few countries where positive growth has 
occurred in real GDP, this has come at too high a cost to the communities concerned. For most African 
economies, there was negative growth in income from their exports and imports for the decades of the 1980s 
(ECA, 1990b). During this period, the average annual growth rate in per capital income, exports and import was 
–2.6 percent, -1.6 percent and – 2.0 percent, respectively. From 1980 to 1993, per capital income decreased   by 
more than 15 percent. This essentially means that mass poverty has been exacerbated, given the considerable 
skewness in income distribution coupled with prevailing inflationary pressures, not to mention demographic 
pressures. The insurgence in some African countries, notably Nigeria where the Islamic fundamentalist under the 
guise of ‘boko haram’, massive loss of lives experienced in the air crashes ,boat mishaps and road accidents have 
not helped matters. 
 In specific policy areas, the results from the operationalization of structural adjustment programs have 
shown the following characteristics: Firstly, stabilization with trade liberalization has resulted in negative export 
and import growth; secondly, lending was considerably below levels required for import growth; thirdly, 
exchange rate adjustments have worsened the balance-of-payments situation and have generated an inflationary 
impact in most economies; fourthly, interest-rate adjustments have not had a positive effect with relatively few 
multinational corporations bent on the continuation of the profitable production of raw materials for export, as 
we have noted. It is essentially this export-orientation that is responsible for the African economic crisis. Thus, 
the privatization measures that have been implemented under SAPs have served to strengthen the export-
orientation of the MNCs in African economies, thereby exacerbating the economic crisis. 
 Therefore, basically, structural adjustment has been contradictory in African economies, which were 
already (and remain) in a persistent recessionary situation. Generally, the contraction in the various economies is 
exhibited in the negative and too low per capital reduction growth rate for the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the 
relatively large reduction in public sector employment under the adjustment programmes, which accounted for 
40 percent of total employment in these countries, necessarily meant a serious contraction of income and demand 
in the economies. As the other sectors have not covered the demand slack, this has inevitably led to deflation in 
the economies. In addition to reducing employment, government  have reduced considerably their spending on 
vital social services, which, too, has had a negative effect on the economy as a whole. 
 Perhaps the most costly of all aspects of the impacts of structural adjustment is the promotion of 
powerful social forces with no interest in poverty alleviation at the expense of the weak social forces actively 
engaged in poverty alleviation activities. Public spending on state repressive activities are being sustained and 
strengthened while public subsidization of poverty alleviation activities is reduced considerably or eliminated. 
With no external wars or threats of external wars, nearly all African governments continue to maintain relatively 
high national defense spending for purposes of containing internal social tensions. Public subsidies are curtailed 
to students in institutions of higher learning, from which the leading poverty alleviation organizations usually 
draw their principal activities. The choice of high defense spending over the subsidization of poverty alleviation 
activities demonstrates the essentially undemocratic nature of African governments. 
The way forward: Growth and Development 
After  nearly a decade of experience with SAPs, characterized by worsening living conditions and the 
intensifications of demands for improved living standards. African governments in 1989 launched AAF-SAP, 
thereby adding yet another pacification device to the already unimplemented package composed of the LPA, 
APPER and UN-PAAERD. At the level of rhetoric, AAF-SAP makes some sense and is therefore of some 
relevance. The principal contribution of AAF-SAP to efforts for resolving the African economic crisis is that it 
provides a framework that essentially stresses the controlling importance of ensuring that short-and medium-
term measures are consistent with the long-term measures for promoting growth with development. However, as 
African governments did not approve AAF-SAP with a view to implementing programmes under such a 
framework, AAF-SAP, the newest soft measure, has already begun to experience the high predictable fate of 
veteran soft measures, notably the LPA, APPER and UN-PAAERD, such a fate is manifested in the 
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implementation of SAP by African governments, none of whom is implementing plans consistent with AAF-
SAP. 
 AAF-SAP is suffering the same fate as the LPA because they share a common fundamental error. This 
error is that neither the LPA nor AAF-SAP makes an analysis of the dynamics of social structure from which one 
can identify social forces that are promotive of development and those that are not. In the absence of a scientific 
analysis of the role of the African state, the LPA and AAF-SAP leave their respective implementation measures 
up to the state to activate, when the state is the very institution that continues to work for growth without 
development in Africa. 
 The sponsoring of the African International Conference on popular Participation in the Recovery and 
Development Process in Africa by the ECA, whose secretariat prepared AAF-SAP, is a step towards correcting 
the fundamental error in both the LPA and AAF-SAP. The African Charter for Popular Participation in 
Development, as prepared by the conference participants, does distinguish between developmental and counter-
developmental social forces (ECA, 1990). On the basis of its delineation of these two sets of social forces, the 
Charter appropriately calls for persistent significant support for people’s development-oriented initiatives, as 
they form the way forward in the drive for growth with development. The people are finding ways to solve the 
development problem in the face of persistent state repression of development-oriented initiatives in Africa. 
 If the prevailing state – operated development strategies and plans of action are not generating growth 
with development, then what is the way forward? If the LPA is not being implemented and instead SAPs rather 
than African governments are actively pursuing AAF-SAP, how can the African people’s living standards be 
improved in a sustained way? 
A. People’s Initiatives 
B. The fundamental mistake in efforts directed at findings the way forward is to conduct a search outside 
of the concrete actions being taken by the African people to improve their living conditions. 
Development has to do with people. Therefore, it is not possible to construct a realistic approach to 
development outside the context of people’s initiatives. An examination of thee initiatives in Africa 
shows that the MNCs, acting through African governments, remain principally responsible for stifling 
people’s development-oriented initiatives. 
 Actions taken by African governments to crush African people’s development initiatives are not at all 
surprising, especially when one takes into consideration the fact that African elites remain interested in using 
African people as cheap labour in the profitable production of raw materials for export. The social structure 
remains highly skewed and African governments  implementation of SAP continues to reinforce the prevailing 
social structure, thereby strengthening the relative power of the rich at the expense of the poor masses. 
 The crux of the people’s initiatives is that they continue to struggle to adjust the social structure and 
power relations, in their interest. Growth with development can take place only if this struggle of the African 
people is successful. The high and rising state military/security expenditures in Africa are directed at forcing the 
poor to accept the prevailing social structure/power relations. It is this use of violent military/security measures 
against the people that is responsible for the numerous internal conflicts in Africa, with their attending refugee 
problem. 
 These internal conflicts are at once the principal obstacles to any meaningful development. State 
repression of people’s initiative renders it immensely difficult, if not impossible, for the people to improve their 
living conditions. The main non-violent state response to these internal conflicts is the call for stability, arguing 
that unless the internal situation is stable, development cannot take place. What this call really means is that the 
African people should end their struggle to protect their development initiatives and accept the status quo: 
growth without development. But, it is essentially when people acquire the power through struggle to determine 
the leadership and direction of the state and the economy that growth with development can take place. This 
means that development cannot take place without democracy. The path to democracy is necessarily unstable 
because of these repressive responses by the African governments. In the face of perennial mass poverty, the 
people take peaceful initiatives to change their living conditions for the better. State response to these initiatives 
is state repression of the initiatives. More often than not, state repression takes on violent forms. 
 In effect, state repression leads to the very instability which the state seeks to avoid. In trying to fend 
ways to defend themselves, the people take action, which at times involves the use of violence, rendering the 
environment unstable and ungovernable.These violent actions are, in fact, internal conflicts, which constitutes 
the centrality of the dynamics in the struggle for democracy and development. At no time in history does one 
find the co-existence of democracy and development in any economy without a past experience of frequent 
social upheavals (Kuznets, 1971). 
Most political conscientization figures prominently in the people’s struggle for democracy and development. The 
state does not remain static with respect to the use of better communications. Essential to the wide and growing 
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gap between developed and developing countries,  as well as the highly skewed worsening income distribution 
within the developing countries, is the considerable capacity that powerful decision-makers have to use cheaper 
communications to implement their plans. The capacity of pro-democracy activists to obtain access to new and 
cheaper forms of information technology and use it to diffuse democratic-oriented political consciousness among 
the masses is therefore most crucial for enhancing the struggle for democracy and development. 
 Given the numerous internal conflicts characterized by gross human rights violations, it is not surprising 
that African is home to over one-third of the world’s refugee population. Generally, people fleeing terrible 
conditions in a country seek asylum in a neighboring country perceived by them to be relatively better off. The 
distribution of refugees in Africa for the 1990s reflects dismal conditions and their accompanying internal 
conflicts in all of the African sub-regions. 
 In the north, Algeria accounts for over 700,000 refugees, Sudan for nearly 800,000. In the South, 
Malawi hosts more than 700,000 refugees, South Africa a quarter of a million, Zimbabwe a little less than a 
quarter of a million, and Zambia almost 150,000. In East Africa, Tanzania has almost 600,000 refugees; Kenya 
has over 300,000, Uganda almost 300,000 and Ethiopia about a quarter of a million. On the West Coast, Guinea 
is home to nearly 600,000 refugees, Cote d’Ivoire a quarter million, Liberia more than 150,000, Ghana around 
150,000 and Sierra Leone over 100,000. In Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo hosts nearly half a 
million refugees, Rwanda 300,000, Burundi almost 300,000. In West Africa Benin has more than 150,000 
refugees in a region that is becoming increasingly unstable (UNDP, 1996). 
B. Multi – Party Democracy 
   Today, Multi – Party democracy is in vogue in most parts of Africa because of the pressures the Western 
countries have been making as part of the “Adjustment” and “reform” measures pursued by the “donor 
community”. How is it, then, that African states are not supportive of the building of democracy when there is 
such a euphoria? What is happening is that African elite is trying yet again to abort the struggle for democracy 
without addressing the fundamental problems concerning the people’s needs and aspirations. There is abundant 
evidence to demonstrate that, while political parties are operating in some African countries, there is in fact no 
democracy in these countries. 
Local electoral commission and the international community have become collaborators in declaring bogus 
elections free, fair, transparent and democratic. If these elections were democratic, why do the African 
governments concerned spend such a gargantuan share of national budgets on national security, when there is 
clearly no foreign threat? When Dr. Chester Crocker was Assistant Secretary of State for the United State 
government, he heaped lavish praises on the 1985 general and presidential elections in Liberia as being perhaps 
the most free, fair, transparent and democratic elections in Africa to date. 
 After he was removed from the commands of government to the demands of academia, Croker 
lamented that the United State government had made a terrible mistake in Liberia by giving credence to the 1985 
elections and unprecedented support to the Liberian government. His lamentation came in the midst of a Liberian 
civil war that displayed the measure of over 200,000 Liberians, at least 10 percent of the population of Liberia, 
and displaced 1.5 million people internally and externally. In effect, bogus elections have become principal 
explanatory factor for internal conflicts. African elites, in collaboration with the colonialists, took over state 
power and aborted the people’s struggle at that time. Now, the African state is yet again seeking to manage 
change in its interest by manipulating the process of democratic transition in their favour in the same way the 
colonialists did in the transition from colonialism to independence. 
 Just as African states are not supportive of installing democracy, they are also not interested in the 
pursuit of economic integration. African states consider economic integration to be disruptive of the production 
of raw materials for export systems, which continues to serve African elites and the MNCs so well. For example, 
this anti-integration posture is manifested in the very low and falling intra-African trade as well as in the 
continuous depositing of 65 percent of the external reserves of the CFA Zone countries in the French Treasury. 
 Having delineated the social forces that are supportive of growth with development, we proceed to 
present some strategies for African recovery. These are: Immediate, short – term, medium – term and long – 
term development – oriented approaches, which, in essence, constitute the operational agenda for development-
oriented social forces. In this way, one would be expecting people’s organizations rather than the state to take the 
lead in the implementation of the agenda for recovery and development in Africa. 
Immediate Approaches 
Basically, immediate approaches to development in Africa should be designed to attend to famine and disaster 
relief. Some measures under these approaches are geared towards attending to existing emergencies, while other 
measures are directed at handling future emergencies given the recurrent nature of famine in Africa. With respect 
to attending to existing emergencies. Key relevant measures relate to the immediate provision of the following: 
(a) Food, especially cereals; (b) Water; (c) Transportation, storage and distribution of food and medicines; (d) 
settlement of families on new lands; (e) Implementation of health programmes and increasing their spread; (f) 
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Action on maintaining or increasing nutrition levels, particularly through food distribution programmes in times 
of famine; (g) livestock development; (h) income generating relief projects; and (i) energy production. 
 The measures related to future emergencies are as follows: (a) provision of inputs for subsequent 
planting seasons; (b) establishment of security reserves of food, medicines, fodder and water; (c) setting up 
effective early-warning systems; (d) establishing permanent structures to cope with emergencies; (e) training of 
emergency-oriented personnel; (f) strengthening the capacity of donor countries to respond effectively to the 
emergency requests of African countries. 
a. Short to Medium – Term Approaches 
Early during the short to medium term, principal emphasis should be given to establishing and developing an 
effective organizational capacity of the poor and marginalized populations. Such organizational capacity would 
enable them to begin to participate effectively in decision-making that affects them. The present thrust of 
government policies to foster popular participation in African economies, with the exception of extremely few 
cases, trends to fuel the development crisis, as these policies only encourage the poor to “participate” marginally 
in the implementation of decisions already made by a very few top national policy-masters. It is only when the 
process of effective participation of the marginalized population begins in earnest that measures for the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy can become of relevance in terms of dealing with the 
development crisis. 
b. Long – Term Approaches 
It is during the long term that greater importance should be given to the strengthening of the organizational 
capacity of the marginalized and poor people to a higher level. Such high – level organizational capacity of the 
poor would facilitate the structural transformation of the economy so that it ceases to be poverty-generating and 
becomes poverty-alleviating for them. At this high-level organizational capacity of the poor, development 
programmes would embody power-yielding approaches that strengthen the relative power position of the poor 
within the social structure. The above programmes would be designed and implemented within a strategic 
framework in which there are relationships  among specific programmes in a given broad programmes areas, as 
well as interrelationships between Programme areas. This strategic approach to development would include 
programmes designed and implemented to achieve the following; 
a) Development of a political and administrative capacity for local, regional and national decision-making 
that is protective of the interest of the poor. 
b) Equitable distribution of land and other rural resources with a view to providing high-priority 
opportunities for small farmers to improve their socio-economic conditions. 
c) The development of local human and natural resources for utilization in industrialization; in this 
context, foreign trade will be promoted to the extent of capacity to promote industrialization in the 
African economy. 
d) Diversification of social-economic activities in the rural areas so as to generate employment and income 
opportunities, and the development of small to medium scale industries for agricultural development. 
e) Expansion of social services, consistent with raising the productive capacities of the people. 
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